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Abstract Almost fifty years ago, D.E. Bell and L. LaPadula published the first
formal model of a secure system, known today as the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model.
BLP is described as a state machine by means of first-order logic and set theory.
The authors also formalize two state invariants known as security condition and
*-property. Bell and LaPadula prove that all the state transitions preserve these
invariants.
In this paper we present a fully automated proof of the security condition and
the *-property for all the model operations. The model and the proofs are coded in
the {log} tool. As far as we know this is the first time such proofs are automated.
Besides, we show that the {log} model is also an executable prototype. Therefore
we are providing an automatically verified executable prototype of BLP.
Keywords Bell-LaPadula model, security, automated proof, {log}, set theory,
binary relations
1 Introduction
Computer security is perhaps one of the first application domains where formal
methods were thoroughly applied almost from the birth of the field. In fact, com-
puter security was born as part of the defense sector and thus it instantly became a
critical application. Nobody could afford the costs of a lethal enemy gaining access
to military or intelligence secrets processed and stored in computers. Hence, the
software running on those computers ought to be bug-free.
Since the early seventies of the 20th century, the Department of Defense (DoD)
of the USA funded R+D projects seeking methods and tools to develop secure soft-
ware [2,6,7,24]. In this context, ‘secure’ means software that can keep information
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confidential. Through the years this problem proved to be (perhaps unexpectedly)
subtle and complex [31].
Around 1973, D.E. Bell and L. LaPadula, from the Mitre Corporation, pub-
lished the first formal model of a secure operating system [6,7]. Today this model
is known as the Bell-LaPadula model, abbreviated as BLP. BLP is described as
a state machine by means of first-order logic and set theory. They used an ad
hoc mathematical notation. The model also formalizes two state invariants known
as security condition and *-property. Bell and LaPadula prove that all the state
transitions preserve these invariants.
Over the years, BLP has been thoroughly studied, reviewed and criticized
causing a good deal of controversy around it [25,31]. In a way or another, BLP
remains one of the most cited models in the computer security literature and
one of a handful secure models that has been implemented and used. In 1982
J. Goguen and J. Meseguer proposed the notion of non-interference as a new
definition for secure systems [22]. From the dawn of this century the computer
security community agrees that non-interference improves on BLP and the former
is now considered the dominant approach to the problem of building secure systems
[31,29].
Nevertheless, from a formal verification perspective, in particular concerning
proof automation, BLP is still a challenging problem because of its complexity.
Specifically, the automated verification of the security condition and the *-property
is a difficult problem. In effect, the formal description of BLP uses several complex
set and relational operators (such as those available in formal notations like B [1]
and Z [33]) and different forms of universally quantified formulas. Actually, both
the security condition and the *-property are universally quantified formulas, the
latter involving two universally quantified variables. In this regard, we consider
BLP as a sort of benchmark in proof automation—in spite of it not being the
focus of current research in computer security.
Therefore, in this paper we present a fully automated proof of the security
condition and the *-property for all of the BLP model operations. The model and
the proofs are encoded in the {log} (‘setlog’) tool [30]. As far as we know this
is the first time these proofs are fully automated and thus the achievement can
be regarded as a proof pearl. Besides, due to properties and features enjoyed by
{log}, the model is also an executable program. Hence, the {log} model (program)
of BLP can be regarded as a correct prototype w.r.t. the security condition and
the *-property.
Formal verification of secure systems has a long and well-established tradition
[26]. Interactive theorem provers, such as Coq [9] and Isabelle [28], have been used
to mechanically verify a range of security problems and systems [3,27,4], including
BLP [10]. Although the expressive power and proving capabilities of a system such
as Coq are incomparable to {log}’s and while automated proof tactics may help
during security proofs, {log} implementation of BLP provides a fully automated
proof of BLP invariants. This seems not to be the case with more powerful in-
teractive provers. Furthermore, the fact that the {log} model of BLP is also an
executable program gets it closer to the certified programs that can be extracted,
for example, from Coq proofs. However, proposals such as FoCaLiZe [18] use a
combination of manual and automated proofs to prove the correctness of BLP.
FoCaLiZe is an object-oriented programming environment that combines speci-
fications, programs and proofs. Proofs in FoCaLiZe are interactive although the
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Zenon [8] automatic theorem prover provides some automation. Differently from
{log}, FoCaLiZe is inspired by functional programming and type theory. Other
works use a variety of formal or semi-formal verification techniques to analyze
properties of access control models: Stasiak and Zelinski use a model-driven engi-
neering approach to run simulations on an OCL model of BLP [34]; Haraty and
Naous use Alloy to analyze a role-based access control model [23]; in a work in
progress, Devyanin et al. applies Alloy, Event-B and Rodin to prove properties of
a secure operating system [17]. Finally, proof automation does play a key role in
other subfields of computer security such as protocol verification, mostly by means
of different flavors of model-checking [5].
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we introduce the BLP
model as a summary of the original paper. Section 3 presents the {log} tool showing
its constraint solving and proving features. The encoding of the BLP model in {log}
as well as the proof of correctness are explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents
our conclusions.
2 The Bell-LaPadula Model
In this section we briefly introduce the BLP model and some computer security
concepts related to it. We will use the notation of the original report [7], except
when it becomes too obscure. The BLP model is a state machine described by
means of first-order logic and set theory.
2.1 Elements of the model
After an informal introduction where the problem and the approach to solve it are
presented, Bell and LaPadula introduce the elements of the model. The elements
are the base sets, state variables and data structures on which the model is built.
Some of the key elements are the following:
– S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} is the set of subjects. In computer security a subject is any
active entity of the system such as a process, a computer, etc.
– O = {O1, . . . ,Om} is the set of objects. In computer security an object is any
passive entity of the system such as a file or an I/O device, and also a subject
(i.e. S ⊆ O).
– C = {C1, . . . ,Cq} is the set of classifications, where C1 > C2 > · · · > Cq . A clas-
sification, also called security level, indicates the level of access of a subject or
the confidentiality level of an object. A classification is called security clearance
or just clearance when applied to a subject.
– K = {K1, . . . ,Kr} is the set of categories. A category, also called need-to-know,
is a sort of keyword attached to an object or subject.
– A = {r,w, e, a, c} is the set of access attributes: read, write, execute, append,
and control. r is read-only, a is write-only, w is read-write, and c is the access
attribute that lets a subject modify the access attributes of an object.
– F = CS ×CO × (PK )S × (PK )O is the set of classifications and need-to-know
vectors. PA is the power set of A; BA is the set of all functions from A to
B . If (f1, f2, f3, f4) ∈ F then, f1 is the subject-classification function; f2 is the
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object-classification function; f3 is the subject-category function; and f4 is the
object-category function.
– M = {M1, . . . ,Mc} is the set of access matrices. If Mk ∈ M then, Mk is a n×m
matrix with entries from PA. The (i , j ) entry of Mk shows the access attributes
of subject Si w.r.t. object Oj .
Definition 1 (BLP state) Each state of the BLP model is represented as a triple
(b,m, f ) ∈ P(S ×O × A)×M × F where:
– b indicates which subjects have access to what objects in what mode in a given
state;
– m indicates the current access matrix;
– f indicates the clearance level of all subjects, the classification of all objects
and the categories associated with subjects and objects in a given state.
V denotes the set of all BLP states. ⊓⊔
2.2 Security condition
The property called security condition is the formalization of the main access rule
of DoD’s security policy known as multi-level security (MLS) [21]. Informally, this
access rule can be stated as follows:
A person has the right to read a document if and only if the security class
of the person dominates the security class of the document.
A security class is an ordered pair where the first component is a classification
and the second component is a set of categories.
Definition 2 (Security class) An ordered pair (n, c) is a security class iff n ∈ C
and c ∈ PK . ⊓⊔
Definition 3 (Dominates relation) Security class (n2, c2) dominates security
class (n1, c1) iff c1 ⊆ c2 and n1 ≤ n2. ⊓⊔
With these elements we can state when a state satisfies the security condition.
Definition 4 (Security condition) A state (b,m, (f1, f2, f3, f4)) in BLP satisfies
the security condition iff:
∀(s, o, x) ∈ b :
x = e ∨ x = a ∨ x = c ∨ (x ∈ {r,w} ∧ f2(o) ≤ f1(s) ∧ f4(o) ⊆ f3(s)) ⊓⊔
2.3 *-property
The *-property is not part of the MLS policy. It is necessary only when MLS is
implemented on a computer system. This is so because a subject may have read
access to an object o1 and write access to an object o2 such that the security class
of o1 dominates the security class of o2, i.e. f2(o2) ≤ f2(o1) ∧ f4(o2) ⊆ f4(o1). In
this case the subject can copy information from o1 into o2 without the control of
the security system. Here, Bell and LaPadula assume the standard architecture of
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a computing system: security is implemented and enforced solely by the operating
system; processes perform system calls to gain access to objects; but when they
get access, the operating system cannot control the flow of information within each
process space. This situation is the essence of the (perhaps unexpected) difficulty
of the confidentiality problem in general-purpose computing systems.
Therefore, BLP prevents situations like the one described above by defining
model operations that preserve the *-property. In order to state the *-property
Bell and LaPadula introduce the following notation:
b(s : x1, . . . , xt ) = {o : o ∈ O ∧ ((s,o, x1) ∈ b ∨ · · · ∨ (s, o, xt ) ∈ b)}
where b ∈ P(S ×O × A), s ∈ S and x1, . . . , xt ∈ A.
Definition 5 (*-Property) A state (b,m, (f1, f2, f3, f4)) in BLP verifies the *-
property iff:
∀ s ∈ S :
b(s : w, a) 6= ∅ ∧ b(s : r,w) 6= ∅
⇒ ∀ o1 ∈ b(s : w, a); o2 ∈ b(s : r,w) : f2(o2) ≤ f2(o1) ∧ f4(o2) ⊆ f4(o1) ⊓⊔
Informally, the *-property establishes that no subject can access secret objects
in read mode if it also has access to ‘less secret’ objects in write mode. Given that
the component in charge of enforcing security cannot control what subjects do in
their own spaces, the *-property seems a sensible condition.
2.4 The rules
BLP defines ten rules describing how the model transitions from a state to another.
In other words, a rule is a state transition or operation. A rule ρ is a function
R × V → D × V , where R and D are model elements which, informally, represent
the set of requests (R) and the set of decisions (D). Hence, a rule receives a request,
returns a decision and (possibly) takes the system from a state to another. The
ten rules are the following:
– get-read, get-append, get-execute, get-write: a subject requests read, append, ex-
ecute or write access to an object.
– release-read/write/all/execute: a subject stops accessing an object in a given
mode.
– give-read/write/all/execute: a subject grants access to an object to another sub-
ject in a given mode.
– rescind-read/write/all/execute: a subject cancels the access to an object of another
subject in a given mode.
– change-f: the f component of the state is changed by a new one.
– create-object, delete-object: a subject creates or deletes an object.
Next, we show the specification of get-write, which is one of the main rules
of the model to give an idea of how Bell and LaPadula used the mathematical
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language.
get-write : ρ4((σ1, γ, σ2, o, x), (b,m, f )) ≡
if σ1 6= φ ∨ γ 6= get ∨ x 6= w ∨ σ2 = φ
then ρ4((σ1, γ, σ2, o, x), (b,m, f )) = (?, (b,m, f ));
if w /∈ m(σ2, o) ∨ f2(o) > f2(σ2) ∨ f4(o) 6⊆ f3(σ2)
then ρ4((σ1, γ, σ2, o, x), (b,m, f )) = (no, (b,m, f ));
if {q : q ∈ b(σ2 : r) ∧ (f2(q) > f2(o) ∨ f4(q) 6⊆ f4(o)} ∪
{q : q ∈ b(σ2 : a) ∧ (f2(o) > f2(q) ∨ f4(o) 6⊆ f4(q))} ∪
{q : q ∈ b(σ2 : w) ∧ (f2(o) 6= f2(q) ∨ f4(o) 6= f4(q))} = ∅
then ρ4((σ1, γ, σ2, o, x), (b,m, f )) = (yes, augb((σ1, γ, σ2, o, x), (b,m, f )));
else ρ4((σ1, γ, σ2, o, x), (b,m, f )) = (no, (b,m, f ));
where
– The request is a tuple of five components: σi ∈ S ∪ {φ}, where φ /∈ S is a non-
subject element; γ ∈ {get, give, release, rescind, change, create, delete} is a request
element whose purpose is to indicate the kind of order that must be executed
by the rule; o ∈ O ; and x ∈ A.
– In general, σ2 is the requesting subject, σ1 is used in some rules as the subject
to which a permission is given or rescinded, and o is the object to be accessed.
– The component f of the state is assumed to be a tuple of the form (f1, f2, f3, f4).
– ?, yes and no are decisions.
– m(s,o) indicates the (s, o) entry of matrix m.
– augb((σ1, γ, σ2, o, x), (b,m, f )) = (b ∪ {(σ2, o, x)},m, f ).
Remark 1 All the rules have the same interface. The downside of this uniformity
is the need to use symbols such as φ to denote a non-subject and conditions such
as σ1 6= φ to ensure the rule is called with “well-typed” parameters. In modern
presentations of MLS only two access modes are considered, read-only and write-
only, because all the others can be encoded in terms of these two.
In Section 4 we will use the {log} notation to encode BLP. Beyond the syntactic
peculiarities of {log}, our model reflects a modern encoding of BLP, and not a
literal translation of it into {log}. In particular we give each rule an interface
reflecting the parameters it needs and nothing else, and we only define two access
modes. ⊓⊔
After giving the specification of a rule the authors prove that it preserves
the security condition and the *-property. Formally, they prove the following two
lemmas for each rule ρ:
Lemma 1 (Rule ρ is security-preserving) For any request r and state v, if ρ(r , v) =
(d , v ′) and v verifies the security condition, then v ′ verifies the security condition.
Lemma 2 (Rule ρ is *-property-preserving) For any request r and state v, if
ρ(r , v) = (d , v ′) and v verifies the *-property, then v ′ verifies the *-property.
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3 The {log} Constraint Solver
{log} is a publicly available satisfiability solver and a set-based, constraint-based
programming language implemented in Prolog [30]. {log} implements a decision
procedure for the theory of hereditarily finite sets, i.e., finitely nested sets that are
finite at each level of nesting [19]; a decision procedure for a very expressive frag-
ment of the class of finite set relation algebras [14,12]; and a decision procedure for
restricted intensional sets (RIS) [11,13]. This means that sets and binary relations
are first-class entities of the language. At the core of these decision procedures is
set unification [20]. The set terms defined in all these three decision procedures
can be combined in several ways: binary relations are hereditarily finite sets whose
elements are ordered pairs, so set operators can take binary relations as argu-
ments; RIS can be passed as arguments to set operators and freely combined with
extensional sets. {log} is an untyped formalism; variables are not declared; typing
information can be encoded by means of constraints. Several in-depth empirical
evaluations provide evidence that {log} is able to solve non-trivial problems [14,
12,11,13,15]. Given that {log} has been extensively described elsewhere, in this
section we will show a few examples for the reader to understand how it works.
In {log} set operators are encoded as constraints. For example: un(A,B ,C ) is
a constraint interpreted as C = A ∪ B . {log} implements a wide range of set and
relational operators covering most of those used in formal notations such as B and
Z. For instance, in is a constraint interpreted as set membership (i.e. ∈); = is set
equality; dom(F ,D) corresponds to the domain of a binary relation, i.e., domF =
D ; subset(A,B) corresponds to the subset (⊆) relation; comp(R,S ,T ) is interpreted
as T = R ◦ S (i.e., relational composition); and apply(F ,X ,Y ) is equivalent to
pfun(F ) & [X ,Y ] in F , where pfun(F ) constrains F to be a (partial) function.
Formulas in {log} are conjunctions (&) and disjunctions (or) of constraints; they
must finish with a dot (as a Prolog query). Negation in {log} is introduced by
means of so-called negated constraints. For example nun(A,B ,C ) is interpreted as
C 6= A ∪ B and nin corresponds to /∈. For formulas to lay inside the decision
procedures implemented in {log}, users must only use this form of negation.
Set terms can be of the following forms:
– A variable is a set term; variable names must start with an uppercase letter.
– {} is the term interpreted as the empty set.
– {x/A} is called extensional set and is interpreted as {x} ∪ A; A must be a set
term, x can be any term accepted by {log} (basically, any Prolog uninterpreted
symbol, integers, lists, ordered pairs, etc.).
– ris(X in A, φ) is called restricted intensional set (RIS) and is interpreted as {x :
x ∈ A ∧ φ} where φ is any {log} formula; A must be a set term and X is a
bound variable local to the RIS. RIS have a more complex structure of which
we will show a glimpse in Section 4.2; see [11,13] for a detailed presentation.
Being a satisfiability solver, {log} can be used as an automated theorem prover.
To prove that formula φ is a theorem, {log} has to be called to prove that ¬ φ is
unsatisfiable.
Example 1 We can prove that set union is commutative by asking {log} to prove
the following is unsatisfiable:
un(A,B ,C ) & un(B ,A,D) & C neqD .
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As there are no sets satisfying this formula {log} answers no. Note that the formula
can also be written with the nun constraint:
un(A,B ,C ) & nun(B ,A,C ). 
{log} is also a programming language at the intersection of declarative program-
ming, set programming [32] and constraint programming. Hence, {log} programs
are basically set formulas.
Example 2 If we want a program that updates function F in X with value Y
provided X belongs to the domain of F and get an error otherwise, the {log} code
can be the following:
update(F ,X ,Y ,F ,Error) :-
F = {[X ,V ]/F1} & [X ,V ] nin F1 &
F = {[X ,Y ]/F1} &
Error = ok
or
comp({[X ,X ]},F , {}) &
Error = err .
Then, update receives F , X and Y and returns the modified F in F and the
error code in Error—think of F as the value of F in the next state. As & and
or are logical connectives and = is logical equality, the order of the ‘instructions’
is irrelevant w.r.t. the functional result—although it can have an impact on the
performance. Variable F1 is an existentially quantified variable representing the
‘rest’ of F with respect to [X ,V ]. If [X ,V ] does not belong to F then the unification
between F and {[X ,V ]/F1} will fail thus making update to fail as well.
Now we can call update by providing inputs and waiting for outputs:
update({[setlog , 5], [hello, earth], [blp,model ]}, hello,world ,G,E).
returns:
G = {[hello,world ], [setlog , 5], [blp,model ]}
E = ok ⊓⊔
Since update is also a formula we can prove properties true of it.
Example 3 If Error is equal to err then X does not belong to the domain of F . In
order to prove this we need to call {log} on its negation:
update(F ,X ,Y ,F , err) & dom(F ,D) & X in D .
Then, {log} answers no because the formula is unsatisfiable. ⊓⊔
The last {log} feature we want to show is related to RIS. In fact, the intro-
duction of RIS in {log} allows for the definition of restricted universal quantifiers
(RUQ). In general, if A is a set, then a RUQ is a formula of the following form:
∀ x ∈ A : φ
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It is easy to prove the following:
(∀ x ∈ A : φ)⇔ A ⊆ {x : x ∈ A ∧ φ} (1)
Given that {x : x ∈ A ∧ φ} is the interpretation of ris(X in A, φ), the r.h.s. of (1)
can be expressed as the {log} formula:
subset(A, ris(X in A, φ))
In {log} we have defined the foreach constraint to make RUQ easier to write:
foreach(X in A, φ) :- subset(A, ris(X in A, φ)).
We use these features to encode BLP in {log}, to automatically prove Lemmas
1 and 2 for each rule, and to provide a correct prototype of BLP in the form of a
{log} program.
4 Encoding BLP in {log}
The {log} code of the BLP model can be found here https://www.dropbox.com/
s/b9hm04kgo3iy6vb/blp.zip?dl=0. The code includes clauses for each BLP rule;
for the security condition and the *-property; and for each proof obligation. Each
rule is given by stating its pre- and post-conditions. The clauses encoding proof
obligations ensure that all rules preserve the security condition and the *-property
as well as some “typing” invariants.
The {log} model is +1 KLOC long excluding comments. It contains 60 proof
obligations which take 11.5 seconds of computing time to be discharged1. Around
50% of this time is consumed in proving that getRead and getWrite preserve the *-
property. This is consistent with the fact that these two rules are the most security
critical and that the *-property is a rather complex quantified predicate.
In the remainder of this section we will explain the structure of our encoding by
presenting the *-property and the get-write operation as representative examples.
We will emphasize the modifications we introduced w.r.t. the original model. We
close the section showing the structure of the proof obligations.
4.1 The state of the model
State variables are gathered in a set named SState, for Security State.
Definition 6 Let Br , Bw , Fo, Fs and M be variables; and let br , bw , fo, fs and m
be constants. Then, the state of the {log} model of BLP is defined as follows:
SState = {[br ,Br ], [bw ,Bw ], [fo,Fo], [fs,Fs], [m,M ]}
where each ordered pair represents one state variable whose meaning is given
below. The first component of each pair is a constant that allows easy identification
of the corresponding state variable. ⊓⊔
1 This number is obtained on a Latitude E7470 (06DC) with a 4 core Intel(R) CoreTM
i7-6600U CPU at 2.60GHz with 8 Gb of main memory. The software components are the
following: Linux Ubuntu 18.04.3 (LTS) 64-bit with kernel 4.15.0-70-generic, and {log} 4.9.6-
18b over SWI-Prolog (multi-threaded, 64 bits, version 7.6.4).
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The two components named Br and Bw correspond to BLP’s state component
named b. In our model we separated the subjects currently accessing objects in
read mode (Br) from those accessing objects in write mode (Bw). Both variables
are binary relations whose domain are subjects and whose range are objects.
Connected to the separation of b into Br and Bw , is the decision of representing
only two access modes: read , representing a read-only access; and write, represent-
ing a write-only access. This is aligned with modern presentations of MLS. Other
access modes can be encoded in terms of these. For example, BLP’s w is equivalent
to requesting read followed by write (see Section 4.6).
The next two components of SState correspond to BLP’s state component
named f . However, instead of dividing f into four functions, we divide it into
two: Fo is the function associating objects with security classes; and Fs does the
same for subjects. Following Definition 2, in the {log} model, a security class is
represented as an ordered pair [L,C ] where L is a natural number and C is a set.
In relation to this we define the following clause:
dominates([L1,C1], [L2,C2]) :- subset(C1,C2) & L1 =< L2.
The last component in SState corresponds to the state variable with the same
name in BLP, that is the access matrix. However, in our model M is a binary
relation whose elements are of the form [O , [S ,mode]] where O is an object, S is a
subject and mode is either read or write.
4.2 Encoding the *-property
Having defined the state variables we encode the *-property in the following clause:
starprop(SState) :-
SState = {[br ,Br ], [bw ,Bw ], [fo,Fo], [fs,Fs], [m,M ]} &
foreach([S1,O1] in Br ,
foreach([S2,O2] in Bw ,
[Sco1,Sco2],
S1 neq S2 or dominates(Sco1,Sco2),
apply(Fo,O1,Sco1) & apply(Fo,O2,Sco2)
)
).
As can be seen, starprop uses two nested foreach constraints. The innermost foreach
constraint uses some arguments we have not presented so far. These arguments al-
low for the declaration of existentially quantified variables inside the RUQ ([Sco1,Sco2])
which can be used to get the ‘result’ of some (auxiliary) constraints. In this case,
we get the security class of O1 and O2 by means of two apply constraints.
The predicate inside the innermost foreach constraint is logically equivalent to:
S1 = S2⇒ dominates([Lo1,Co1], [Lo2,Co2])
but as {log} does not provide implication, we encode it as a disjunction.
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Now we will argue that our encoding of the *-property is a faithful represen-
tation of Definition 5. First, note that the antecedent in Definition 5 is not really
necessary as the *-property becomes trivially true when any of those sets are
empty. Then, recall that in our model we only have read (read-only, i.e., BLP’s r)
and write (write-only, i.e., BLP’s a), so b(s : w, a) becomes b(s : a) while b(s : r,w)
becomes b(s : r). Finally, the quantification over s in Definition 5 can be reduced
to a quantification over those subjects that are accessing some object, because
otherwise they pose no risk to the security of the system. Therefore, since in our
definition we quantify over Br and Bw , we are covering all possibly dangerous
subjects.
4.3 Encoding the rules
As we have put in advance (cf. Remark 1), in our model each rule receives the pa-
rameters that it needs. For this reason the first if clause of each rule in BLP is not
necessary in our model. On the other hand, we have added some pre-conditions
that BLP does not include. For example, some of our rules check that an ob-
ject passed as a parameter belongs to the domain of Fo. In our model, release-
read/write/all/execute and rescind-read/write/all/execute are divided in two rules: one
for releasing/rescinding a read access and the other for write access. giveRW en-
codes give-read and give-write. Our version of change-f takes as input an object and
a security class and replaces the security class of the former with the latter.
Now, as an example, we show our encoding of get-write.
getWrite(SState, S ,O ,SState ,Out) :-
getWriteOk(SState, S ,O ,SState ,Out)
or getWriteE1(SState, S ,O ,SState ,Out)
or getWriteE2(SState, S ,O ,SState ,Out)
or getWriteE3(SState, S ,O ,SState ,Out)
or getWriteE4(SState, S ,O ,SState ,Out).
where SState is the start state, S is the subject requesting write access to object O ,
SState is the after state, and Out is the decision or answer returned by the rule.
As can be seen, the specification is divided into five cases. The first one is called
the normal clause, while the last four are called abnormal clauses. The normal
clause corresponds to the case when the rule returns yes; the abnormal ones when
it returns no.
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For example, getWriteOk specifies the case when S can access O in write mode
by giving the pre-conditions and post-conditions:
getWriteOk(SState, S ,O ,SState ,Out) :-
SState = {[br ,Br ], [bw ,Bw ], [fo,Fo], [fs,Fs], [m,M ]} &
[O , [S ,write]] inM &
[S ,O ] nin Bw &
apply(Fo,O ,Sco) &
foreach([Si ,Oi ] in Br , [Scoi ],
Si 6= S or dominates(Scoi ,Sco), apply(Fo,Oi ,Scoi)) &
Bw = {[S ,O ]/Bw} &
SState = {[br ,Br ], [bw ,Bw ], [fo,Fo], [fs,Fs], [m,M ]} &
Out = yes.
As can be seen, the clause checks that: a) S has write access to O according to the
access matrix; b) S is not already accessing O in write mode; and c) all objects
accessed by S in read mode have security classes below O ’s. If all these conditions
are met, then [S ,O ] is added to Bw and the state is updated accordingly.
Finally, the clauses getWriteE* specify the cases where some of the pre-conditions
of getWriteOk are not met. In these cases the after state is equal to the start state
and the decision is no.
4.4 Type invariants
Besides automatically proving that each rule preserves the security condition and
the *-property, we have defined and automatically proved the following “type”
invariants:
1. Fo is a partial function; formally: pfun(Fo).
2. Fs is a partial function; formally: pfun(Fs).
3. The range of Br is a subset of the domain of M ; formally: dom(M ,D) &
ran(Br ,R) & subset(R,D).
4. The range of Bw is a subset of the domain of M ; formally: dom(M ,D) &
ran(Bw ,R) & subset(R,D).
Verifying that the rules preserve these invariants is important because {log} is
an untyped formalism.
4.5 Proof obligations
All proof obligations are implemented as {log} clauses. There are six proof obli-
gations for each rule: one stating the invariance of the security condition; one for
the *-property; and one for each “type” invariant. Each proof obligation is of the
form:
invariantProperty & rule & ¬ invariantProperty
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where invariantProperty denotes the evaluation of invariantProperty in the after
state returned by the rule. This formula is the negation of the standard invariance
lemma:
invariantProperty ∧ rule ⇒ invariantProperty
as {log} proves unsatisfiability.
The following is the {log} clause stating that getWrite preserves the *-property.
getWritePreservesStarprop(SState, S ,O ,SState ,Out) :-
SState = {[br ,Br ], [bw ,Bw ], [fo,Fo], [fs,Fs], [m,M ]} &
starprop(SState) &
getWrite(SState, S ,O ,SState ,Out) &
SState = {[br ,Br ], [bw ,Bw ], [fo,Fo ], [fs,Fs ], [m,M ]} &
nstarprop(SState ).
The expected answer for a clause encoding a proof obligation is no, as it cor-
responds to a formula that is expected to be unsatisfiable.
All the clauses encoding the proof obligations for a particular rule can be
called from a clause named ρCheck, where ρ is the name of a rule. For exam-
ple, getWriteCheck(SState, S ,O ,SState ,Out) calls (and thus proves) all the proof
obligations of getWrite. All proof obligations can be discharged by calling checkAll.
4.6 A certified BLP prototype
Once all the proof obligations have been discharged, we can regard the {log} model
as correct. Given that {log} models are executable, we can regard the model as
a correct prototype. As such, we can run it from different initial states and with
different inputs to analyze its behavior from a different perspective. We illustrate
this with a simple example.
The following {log} formula defines some BLP state and checks that the security
condition and the *-property are satisfied (this is to ensure the simulation starts
from a consistent state).
SS1 = {[br ,Br ], [bw ,Bw ], [fo,Fo], [fs,Fs], [m,M ]} &
Br = {} & Bw = {} &
Fo = {[o1, [1, {f 14}]], [o2, [2, {f 14, f 15}]]} &
Fs = {[s1, [1, {cia}]], [s2, [2, {f 14, cia, f 15}]]} &
M = {[o1, [s1, read ]], [o1, [s2,write]], [o2, [s2, read ]], [o2, [s2,write]]} &
seccond(SS1) & starprop(SS1).
Now we can run different simulations as the following one:
getWrite(SS1, s2, o2,SS2,Out1) & getRead(SS2, s2, o2,SS3,Out).
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where subject s2 requests read and write access to object o2, in which case the
relevant part of the computed answer is:
SS3 = {[br , {[s2, o2]}], [bw , {[s2, o2]}], . . . }
Out = yes
That is, the model gives s2 both accesses to o2 because s2’s security class is above
o2’s, and s2 is not accessing other objects. A subject calling these two operations
on the same object is equivalent to having an operation requesting read-write
access to the object.
However, if we run a simulation where s2 requests write access to o1 and read
access to o2:
getWrite(SS1, s2, o1,SS2,Out1) & getRead(SS2, s2, o2,SS3,Out).
the answer is:
SS3 = {[br , {}], [bw , {[s2, o1]}], . . . }
Out = no
That is, the model gives s2 access to o1 but it does not to o2 because otherwise
the *-property would be violated as o2’s security class is above o1’s.
Analyzing a model in this way might save precious time when proofs are run
because this tends to decrease the number of failed proof attempts. This is specially
appreciated in the context of manual proofs. Tools such as QuickChick [16] have
been proposed along these lines.
4.7 Further analysis
So far we have used {log} to model BLP and to discharge the proof obligations
originally presented by Bell and LaPadula. However, {log} can be used to conduct
further analysis over the model.
For example, {log} can be used the check whether or not the sub-clauses defin-
ing each rule form a partition of the input space. In turn, this can be done in two
ways: a) by running simulations representing a partition of the input space; and b)
by proving that the disjunction of the pre-conditions of each clause is equivalent
to true and that these pre-conditions are pairwise disjoint. Clearly, option b) is
better but a) can be used as a first approximation.
Example 4 (Analysis by simulation) As stated in the BLP model, the giveRW oper-
ation does not consider the case when a subject s1 tries to give read access to an
object o1 to another subject s2 who already has this access. This can be uncovered
by defining a BLP state where s2 has read access to o1:
aState(SS) :-
SS = {[br ,Br ], [bw ,Bw ], [fo,Fo], [fs,Fs], [m,M ]} &
Br = · · · & Bw = · · · & Fo = · · · & Fs = · · · &
M = {[o1, [s1, read ]], [o1, [s1, ctrl ]], [o1, [s2, read ]]}.
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and then running a simulation starting from aState where the same access is given
again to s2:
aState(SS1) & giveRW(SS1, s1, s2, o1, read , SS2,Out2).
in which case the simulation fails making the error evident.
Example 5 (Analysis by proof) The error uncovered in Example 4 can be also re-
vealed by attempting to prove that the negation of the disjunction of the pre-
conditions of each clause of giveRW is unsatisfiable.
(X nin {read ,write} or [O , [S ,X ]] ninM or [O , [S , ctrl ]] ninM or [O , [Si ,X ]] inM ) &
X in {read ,write} &
(X nin {read ,write} or [O , [S ,X ]] inM ) &
[O , [S , ctrl ]] inM
If this formula is run on {log} it answers:
X = read ,M = {[O , [S , ctrl ]], [O , [Si , read ]], [O , [S , read ]]/N1}
which is exactly what was discovered in Example 4.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have presented an automated proof of two well-known security properties car-
ried out with the {log} tool. These properties are quantified formulas over the the-
ory of sets and binary relations. {log} proved to be expressive enough as to model
a complex security model; and proved to be powerful enough as to automatically
discharge, in a rather short time, all the proof obligations required by the model.
Furthermore, as the {log} model is executable it can be executed, first, to ‘test’ it
and, second, after discharging the proof obligations, as a correct-by-construction
prototype.
As a future work, we plan to develop a tool over {log} which would auto-
matically generate the proof obligations needed to verify the invariants of a state
machine. This would not only save precious human time but, fundamentally, would
be less error prone.
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